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Note

Expansion of the Reservation

Of Water Rights Doctrine
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
2
Cappaert v. United States' is the latest in a long line of cases
dealing with the implied reservation of water rights doctrine. This
doctrine, also known as the Winters doctrine because it originated
in Winters v. United States,3 says that when the United States
government reserves land, it also reserves enough water to accomplish its purposes. 4 In substance, the doctrine means that when
water is needed to accomplish the purpose of a reservation, the
federal government can take without compensation whatever
amount of unappropriated water existed on the date the reservation
was established. Cappaert involved an attempt by the Supreme
Court to clarify the issues and questions that have arisen from the
implied reservation of water rights doctrine.

II. SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE
In Winters v. United States,5 the federal government brought

suit on behalf of certain Indians to enjoin farmers from diverting
water from a river for irrigation. The defendant farmers began
diverting water in 1900, and under the prior appropriation law 6 of
1. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
2. See Powers v. United States, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), modified, 330

F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist.,
104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650

(9th Cir. 1939); Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States
v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).

3. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
4. The doctrine is wholly of judicial origin. It has been neither abrogated nor expanded by Congress, although several attempts have been
made. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976).
5. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
6. Essentially the doctrine of prior appropriation is one of first in time,
first in right. The first person to divert water from a stream has a
prior right to a certain amount of water over all subsequent users if
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the west they should have prevailed over the Indians who had used
the waters of the river before 1900, but who had not complied with
the prior appropriation laws ot the state.
The river was adjacent to the Indian reservation, established by
treaty in 1888 "for the purpose of opening for settlement a large
portion of such area" that the Indians had previously occupied in
Montana. The Court found that the purpose of the reservation
was to civilize the Indians and turn them into farmers.8 For this
they needed water because the land was worthless for farming
without irrigation. The Court, therefore, held that there was an
implied reservation of water, which was exempt from the appropriation law of the state, and which was reserved as of the date of the
treaty.9 Furthermore, the Court held that the government reserved
the water "for a use which would be necessarily continued through
years."' 0
Because the Winters doctrine was a judicial doctrine, its attributes developed as new controversies arose. Winters held that the
priority date of the water right was the date the reservation was
established by treaty. This later was extended to include establishment by executive order or by statute." Therefore, the reserved
right was superior to all subsequently created state rights, and was
exempt from the appropriation laws of the states.12 This concept
later was extended to mean that the federal government's rights
"cannot be lost by nonuse under state laws, nor by legal action of
the various states through condemnation, inverse condemnation, or
statutory enactment, nor by private appropriation."' 3 The doctrine has been applied to waters arising upon, traversing or adjacent to the reservation.' 4
Winters and its progeny' 5 applied solely to Indian reservations.
It was not until 1963, in Arizona v. California,'6 that the United
he complies with state law. Under this doctrine, a prior appropriator
can stop subsequent appropriators, whether upstream or downstream,
from diverting water until he receives that certain amount.
7. 207 U.S. at 567.
8. Id. at 576.
9. Id. at 577.
10. Id.

11. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
12. 207 U.S. at 577.
13. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U.L. Rnv. 639, 655
(footnotes omitted).
14. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Walker
River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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States Supreme Court applied the Winters doctrine to non-Indian
lands. In Arizona, the Court said:
The Master ruled that the principle underlying the reservation
of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to
other federal establishments such as National Recreation Areas and
National Forests. We agree with the conclusion of the Master that
the United States intended to reserve water sufficient for the future
requirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the
Imperial National Wildlife
7
Refuge and the Gila National Forest.'
Arizona surprised everyone. Except in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon,18 there was no indication that the implied
reservation of water rights doctrine applied to reservations other
than Indian reservations. The doctrine was broadened again in
United States v. DistrictCourt for Eagle County,'9 where the Court
20
held that federally reserved lands included any federal enclave.
Eagle County thus brought national parks, monuments, forests, fish
and wildlife areas, and military reservations under the reserved
rights doctrine.
Many problems were raised by these decisions. First, there is a
significant difference between the doctrine of prior appropriation
and the Winters doctrine of reserved rights. The doctrine of prior
appropriation promotes the best use of a scarce and important
resource. If the resource remains unused, the right is lost. The
Winters doctrine, which covers future as well as present needs and
exists side by side with the doctrine of prior appropriation, promotes uncertainty because water rights are not lost through nonuse
and because the rights are not quantified. This means that the
highest and best use of a scarce resource will not be achieved. For
example, why should someone upstream from a federal reservation
or someone who shares the same underground acquifer with a
federal reservation develop this resource when it might be possible
for him to be divested of his water right after spending large sums
of money?
Second, for a long time there was no way to adjudicate these
17. Id. at 601.
18. 349 U.S. 435 (1955). This case was not a water rights case per se;
however, it distinguished "public lands," and "reservations." The
Court held that, "'Public lands' are lands subject to private appropriation and disposal under public land laws. 'Reservations' are not so
subject." Id. at 443-44. This meant that non-Indian federal reservations did not have to fulfill the requirements of state law before they
could appropriate water for their own use.
19. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
20. Id. at 523.
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reserved rights. Because of sovereign immunity, it was impossible
to bring the United States into court. This problem has been
alleviated by the McCarran amendment 2 ' which allows the United

States to be joined as a defendant for the adjudication of water
rights, and by the Eagle County case, holding that the McCarran
amendment applied to federal reserved rights. Furthermore, in

Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 22 the
be adjudicated in
Court held that Indian reserved rights also 2could
3
state court under the McCarran amendment.
Third, in a stream-wide adjudication of reserved rights there is
the problem of quantification. That is, what is the basis for
establishing the quantity of reserved federal rights and should these
rights be quantified at all? If they remain unquantified, there is a
problem of not promoting the best use of a scarce and important
resource because economic development will be limited if there is
no certainty of a future water right. However, if the rights- are
quantified, the future needs of the federal government may not be
met.
Fourth, how does one identify the purposes for which the
reservation was established in order to determine if there is an
implied reservation of water rights?
Before examining Cappaert, it is appropriate to note that at
least two commentators have concluded that "[t]he reservation
doctrine is a financial doctrine and nothing more. ' 24 This is so
because it "is not open to question that if the United States needs
water for the exercise of a constitutional power and the implementation of a federal statute, it may physically take it. It may or may
not be constitutionally required to pay compensation, but it may
21. 43 U.S.C.§ 666 (1970):

(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of
water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water
rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit.
22. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
23. Id. at 809.
24. F.

TRELEASE, NATIONAL WATER CommIssION, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
See also Corker, Federal-StateRelations
IN WATER LAW 147m (1971).

in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17 RocKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 579 (1972).

"The only significant function of a reserved

water right is to avoid payment of compensation, because the United
States can without a reservation acquire any water right for any authorized purpose." Id. at 593.
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take the water. ' 25 This becomes clear if Winters is examined in
more detail. Congress could have appropriated money to pay for the
water the Indians were using, but it showed no inclination to do so.
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court found a way out for
the Indians. Because the Court could not force Congress to pay, it
forced the settlers to pay by finding a prior right vested in the
Indians. It is clear that the Indians, as wards of the nation, did
need protection. It is less clear why the federal government needed protection.
Arizona v. California26 applied the reservation doctrine to all
federal reservations of lands. The Court did not do this to get the
water, because the federal government already had that power
under the supremacy clause.2 7 Arizona posed two major questions: What happens to water rights acquired at great expense
before 1963, which suddenly became subject to the reservation
doctrine? What happens to the concept of notice when the Supreme Court guards the federal treasury?
Prior to Cappaert,it was noted that
[I] n light of Eagle County, however, it is apparent that a court can
find a federal reserved water right if (1) the land in question constitutes a federal enclave or reservation, (2) the land is withdrawn
from the public domain, and (3) the circumstances surrounding
creation of the enclave 28or withdrawal of the reservation reveal an
intent to reserve water.
In Cappaert, the United States Supreme Court confirmed and
expanded this reservation doctrine.
III.

THE FACTS OF CAPPAERT

In 1952, President Truman by proclamation 29 added Devil's
Hole to the Death Valley National Monument. The hole is a deep
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

F. TRELEASE, supra note 24, at 147j.
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
See notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text supra.
Ranquist, supra note 13, at 651.
WHEREAS the said pool is a unique subsurface remnant of the

prehistoric chain of lakes which in Pleistocene times formed
the Death Valley Lake System, and is unusual among caverns
in that it is a solution area in distinctly striated limestone,
while also owing its formation in part to fault action; and
WHEREAS the geologic evidence that this subterranean pool is
an integral part of the hydrographic history of the Death
Valley region is further confirmed by the presence in this
pool of a peculiar race of desert fish, and zoologists have
demonstrated that this race of fish, which is found nowhere
else in the world, evolved only after the gradual drying up
of the Death Valley Lake System isolated this fish population
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limestone cavern and contains a pool which "is a remnant of the
prehistoric Death Valley Lake System."30 The forty acre tract of
land on which the hole lies was withdrawn from the public domain
under the Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities, 31 and
is managed by the National Park Service.
The Cappaerts owned a 12,000 acre ranch near Devil's Hole.
The ranch represented an investment of more than seven million
dollars, and employed more than 80 people with an annual payroll
of over $340,000.32 In 1968, the Cappaerts began irrigating their
land by pumping groundwater from an underground acquifer
which was also the source of water in Devil's Hole. 33 After they
started pumping the summer water level of the pool in Devil's Hole
began to decrease. Beginning in 1962, the level of water in Devil's
Hole was measured with reference to a copper marker installed on
one of the walls of the hole by the U.S. Geological Survey. Until
1968, the water level, with seasonable variations, had been stable
at 1.2 feet below the copper marker. In 1969 the water level in
Devil's Hole began to decrease until it was nearly four feet below
34
the marker in 1972.

When the water in the pool decreased more than 3.0 feet below
the copper marker, a large rock shelf became exposed and reduced
the spawning area of Devil's Hole pupfish-a species found only in
the Devil's Hole pool. As this spawning area was reduced, the
breeding ability of the pupfish was impaired.
The Cappaerts applied to the State Engineer of Nevada in
April of 1970 for permits to change the use of water from several
of their wells. 35 The National Park Service learned of their application and filed a protest. The National Park Service was reprefrom the original ancestral stock that in Pleistocene times was
common to the entire region; and
WHEREAs the said pool is of such outstanding scientific impor-

tance that it should be given special protection, and such protection can be best afforded by making the said forty-acre
tract containing the pool a part of the said monument .
17 Fed. Reg. 691 (1952).
30. 426 U.S. at 131.
31.
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States
to be national monuments ....
16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
32. 426 U.S. at 133.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 134.
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sented at a hearing conducted by the State Engineer on December
16, 1970, and requested either that the Cappaerts' application be
denied or that decision on the application be postponed until
studies were completed 36 on which of Cappaerts' wells could be
pumped safely to prevent lowering of the water level in Devil's
37
Hole.
The State Engineer would not postpone the hearing and at its
completion overruled the National Park Service's protest.
[H]e stated that there was no recorded federal water right with
respect to Devil's Hole, that the testimony indicated that the Cappaerts' pumping would not unreasonably lower the water table or
adversely affect existing water rights, and that the permit would
be granted since further economic development of the Cappaerts'
land would be in the public interest.3 8
In August, 1971, the United States filed suit in the Federal District Court for Nevada to prevent the Cappaerts from pumping
from six specific wells near Devil's Hole except for domestic purposes. The complaint alleged that the United States, in establishing
Devil's Hole as part of Death Valley National Monument, reserved
the unappropriated waters appurtenant to the land to the extent
necessary for the requirements and purposes of the reservation and
that the Cappaerts had no perfected water rights as of the date of
the reservation.3 9 The complaint also alleged that irreparable
harm to the United States would ensue because, by lowering the
water level, the Cappaerts were threatening the survival of the
pupfish. The district court entered a preliminary injunction limiting pumping from designated wells so as to return the level of
Devil's Hole to not more than 3.0 feet below the marker. 40 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 4 ' and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to consider
the scope of the implied
'42
reservation of water rights doctrine.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, affirmed. The Court held that when the United States
withdrew the forty acres of land known as Devil's Hole it reserved
enough appurtenant unappropriated water "to maintain the level of
36. Id.
37. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id, at 134-35.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974).
426 U.S. at 138.
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the pool to preserve its
scientific value and thereby implement
43
Proclamation No. 2961."

The Court reviewed ,the reserved water rights doctrine and in
general reaffirmed it. However, for the first time the Court specifically set forth all the attributes of the reservation doctrine as it
applies to non-Indian reservations of federal land.
The Court stated it as follows:
[W] hen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government,
by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to
the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In
so doing the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water
rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which
permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property
Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of reserved
lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing
water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams. 44
The Court clarified the above definition, stating that:
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether
the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to
accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created. 45
It then stated where one must look to find these "purposes." The
Court first looked to the Proclamation which recited that the pool
should be given special protection. 46 It then looked to the National Park Service Act 47 to which reference was made in the Presidential Proclamation and which
provides that the "fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations" is "to conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future genera48
tions."
The Cappaerts had argued that the Act for the Preservation of
American Antiquities did not bestow on the President the authority
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 147.
Id. at 138 (citations omitted).
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
426 U.S. at 140-41 (citation omitted).

418

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 2 (1977)

to reserve a pool of water. However the Court found that "[tihe
pool in Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitants are 'objects of historic
or scientific interest' ",4) as required by the Act.
Nevada, also a petitioner, argued that the Winters doctrine was
"an equitable doctrine calling for a balancing of competing interests." 50 The Court found that this was not the test, and noted that
in Winters the upstream farmers had invested much money in their
irrigation projects which no longer could be used.
The Court also found that the implied reservation of water
doctrine reserved only water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation and no more. 51 Here, because the purpose of the
reservation was the preservation of the pool and its fish, the Court
found that the district court tailored its injunction to minimal need,
curtailing pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an
adequate water level at Devil's
Hole, and implement the stated
52 objectives of the proclamation.
The Court recognized that groundwater and surface water are
related hydrologically and therefore held that the implied reservation of water rights doctrine also applied to groundwater. 5
Petitioners argued that the United States should conform to
state law in perfecting its rights. They contended that the Desert
Land Act of 187754 severed nonnavigable water from public land,
subjecting it to state law. 55 However, the Court correctly cited its
previous decision in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon,56
which Theld that the Desert Land Act was inapplicable to reserved

lands.

5

The final argument by Nevada was that because the National
Park Service filed a protest to the Cappaerts' pumping permit
application in the state administrative proceeding, 58 the United
States was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. However,
the Court merely noted that the United States was never a party to
that proceeding and thus was not estopped from raising its right in
federal court. 59
49. Id. at 142.

50. Id. at 138.
51. Id. at 141.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 142.
54. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
55. 426 U.S. at 143.
56. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
57. Id. at 443-44.

58. 426 U.S. at 143.
59. Id.
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Looking to the implied reservation of water rights doctrine test
set forth by Ranquist 60 prior to Cappaert it is found that much of
0
'
what was known before was repeated by the Court in Cappaert.
However the Court did add some new embellishments.
For example, Ranquist's test looked to the circumstances surrounding the creation of a reservation, while Cappaert provided
guidance in this area by directing one to look at all possible
documents and statutes to determine the purpose. However, this
may arise regarding how to
does not answer all the questions that 62
interpret those documents and statutes.
Further, Cappaert said that only such water is needed which
minimally fulfills the purpose of the reservation.6 3 When this part
of the opinion is read in conjunction with the Eagle County6 4 case
one interpretation is that the Supreme Court supports quantification of federal reserved water rights. In Eagle County the United
States argued that Colorado water rights were based on the appropriation system which required the permanent fixing of rights to
the use of water at the time of the adjudication, with no provision
for the future needs, as is often required in cases of reserved water
rjghts. 65

This argument was made to prevent reserved

rights

from being adjudicated in state court, and was rejected by the
Supreme Court. It quoted Senator McCarran, chairman of the
committee reporting on the bill, who said;
"S. 18 is not intended . . . to be used for any other purpose than
to allow the United States to be joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners on a given
stream. This is so because unless all of the parties owning or in
the process of acquiring water rights on a particular stream can
60. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
61. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
62. See Corker, supra note 24.
How broad are the federal purposes which quantitatively
measure the federal right? Are the purposes limited to those
which might have been reasonably foreseeable to President
McKinley when he created a national forest, or to his successor who may read in federal statutes still on the books that
a purpose of the national forests is to produce water? Since
the important word labelling "the doctrine" is "implied," there
is vast room for argument. Furthermore, no one with a water
right with a priority after 1900, supplied from a national forest
created in that year, will be greatly cheered to learn that the
United States has a superior right to that water, the size and
nature of the federal right depending on implications yet to
be discerned from documents reposing in federal archives.
Id. at 585-86 (footnotes omitted).
63. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
64. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
,65. Id. at 523.
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be joined as parties defendant, any subsequent decree would be of
little value." 66

Thus, the general tenor of both Cappaert and Eagle County is that
these rights be settled, so that future economic development will
not be stymied by unquantified federal reserved water rights.
This was the conclusion reached by the Idaho Supreme Court7
in Avondale Irrigation District v. North Idaho Properties, Inc.
Avondale presented the issue of "whether in a general adjudication
of water rights in a state court, the United States must quantify its
reserved water rights.16 8 The Idaho Supreme Court held that
under the McCarran amendment69 and its legislative history the
United States was "bound by Idaho state law, and therefore must
quantify the amount of water claimed under the reservation doctrine at the time of the general adjudication of water rights. 7 0° The
court found that congressional intent was "to instill certainty into
the water rights of the citizens of the various states,"'1 and that if
reserved water rights remained unquantified there would be no
certainty.
The fact that the Supreme Court applied the reservation doctrine to groundwater was no surprise.7 2 A tougher question answered in Cappaert was what happens to those water rights that
were acquired at great expense before 1963, before the notice
given by Arizona, which suddenly became subject to the reservation doctrine? The answer was that the government wins. The
Court affirmed the original Winters doctrine and said that the
reserved right vests in unappropriated waters on the date the
reservation is established,7 3 be it 1863 or 1963. Therefore it
refused to attack the basic problem posed by the Winters doctrine,
i.e., it does not promote the highest and best use of a scarce
resource. The Court failed to take into account the uncertainty
that is caused by the significant differences between the doctrine of
prior appropriation and the doctrine of reserved water rights. The
Court may prefer that Congress act in this area. The Court has
recognized that "several bills have been introduced. . . to subject at
'7 4
least some federal water uses to state appropriation doctrines.
66. Id. at 525.
67. 96 Idaho 1, 523 P.2d 818 (1974).
68. Id. at 2, 523 P.2d at 819.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
96 Idaho at 4-5, 523 P.2d at 821-22.
Id. at 3, 523 P.2d at 821.
See Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Mont. 1968).
See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
426 U.S. at 145.
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The Court has tried to implement the policy of the McCarran
amendment by permitting the United States to be brought in as a
party defendant in a stream-wide adjudication of water rights,
including federal reserved rights.75 Perhaps the Court heeded
Corker who said, "My own judgment is that the possibility is slight
that 'the implied reservation doctrine' will ever produce any spectacular happening with respect'76to the flow of water, as distinguished from the flow of words.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Cappaert, the Supreme Court added a little more structure
to the implied reservation of water rights doctrine. Yet it failed to
explain why state water rights created prior to 1963-the date the
reservation doctrine was applied to reservations other than Indian
reservations-must be divested without compensation in favor of
federal reserved rights. The Court failed to explain the purpose of
this "financial doctrine." 77 It seemed to say that all western water
rights ought to be quantified to create more certainty, 78 yet,
it expanded the doctrine of reserved water rights to the detriment of individuals who have put a scarce economic resource
to beneficial use. 79 Until Congress acts, uncertainty will remain.
James Spitzenberger'77
75. See United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520
(1971); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976).
76. Corker, supra note 24, at 587.
77. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 63-71 and accompanying text supra.
79. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).

